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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
Nos. 09-4337 and 10-2186
_____________
SHAHID QURESHI,
Appellant
v.
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS OFFICE (“AAO”) OF THE UNITED STATES
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES (“USCIS”), U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF HOMELAND SECURITY; ROBERT P. WEIMAN, Chief of the AAO, in his
representative capacity; EVANGELINA A. KLAPAKIS, District Director of the
Philadelphia District of U.S.C.I.S. in her representative capacity; UNITED STATES
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (“USICE”); JAMES T. HAYES,
Director of USICE, in his representative capacity,

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D. C. Nos. 1:08-cv-02281 and 1:08-cv-02282)
District Judge: Honorable Christopher C. Conner

Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on November 5, 2010

Before: SCIRICA, RENDELL and ROTH, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: November 23, 2010)
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OPINION

ROTH, Circuit Judge:
On December 19, 2008, Shahid Qureshi petitioned for habeas corpus (No. 094337) and brought a civil action (No. 10-2186). Both actions challenged the denial of his
application for adjustment of status by the United States Citizenship and Immigration
Service (USCIS) and sought specific performance of an alleged promise by U.S.
government officials to help him become a lawful permanent resident. We have
consolidated Qureshi‟s appeals from orders of the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania dismissing his habeas petition and his complaint for lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction.
I. Background
Qureshi alleges in his habeas petition and complaint that he is a native and citizen
of Pakistan and first entered the United States on March 13, 1974, as a crewman with
authorization to stay in the United States until March 25, 1974. When Qureshi stayed
beyond this date, he was placed in deportation proceedings. Over the course of the
following 14 years, Qureshi was involved in a complicated series of proceedings not
relevant here in which legacy Immigration & Naturalization Service (INS) attempted to
prosecute or deport him and he attempted by various means to obtain citizenship or
asylum.
In 1988, Qureshi (still residing in the United States) approached the Department of
2

Justice (DOJ) and offered to provide information about a shipment of hashish in
exchange for assistance in his immigration case. He was placed in contact with Customs
and Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents and provided them information that
culminated in the seizure of 400 kilograms of hashish worth approximately $800,000. As
a result of his assistance, Qureshi alleges that he was promised that he could remain in
the U.S. and would be given a green card (i.e., become a lawful permanent resident).
However, Qureshi was never granted lawful permanent resident status.
In 1993, Qureshi was placed in exclusion proceedings and found excludable
because he lacked proper entry documents and there was reason to believe that he
trafficked in illegal drugs. On September 23, 1993, Qureshi‟s application for asylum and
withholding of deportation was denied and he was ordered excluded and deported from
the United States. On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) reversed the
finding that there was reason to believe that Qureshi had been trafficking in illegal drugs,
but sustained the order of excludability and deportation. Qureshi does not allege whether
he appealed the BIA‟s ruling to this Court.
In 2002, Qureshi (still residing in the United States) filed an application to adjust
his immigration status under the Legal Immigration Family Equity Act, Pub. L. No. 106553, 114 Stat. 2762, 2762A-142 to 149 (the LIFE Act), which was denied by USCIS in
2004 and affirmed by its Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) in 2008. Qureshi
petitioned this Court for review but we dismissed his petition for lack of jurisdiction
because he did “not seek judicial review of the decision denying his application for an
adjustment of status in conjunction with a final order of removal” as required by 8 U.S.C.
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§ 1255a(f)(4)(A). Qureshi v. U.S. Att’y Gen., No. 08-3128, Order at 1-2 (3d Cir. Aug.
28, 2008) (citing Orquera v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 413, 421 (4th Cir. 2003)).
II. Procedural History
On December 19, 2008, Qureshi (who is not in immigration detention and still
remains in the United States) filed a petition for habeas corpus and a three-count
complaint, naming as defendants USCIS, AAO, U.S. Immigrtation & Customs
Enforcement (USICE), and officials from these agencies. Both the complaint and the
habeas petition challenge the AAO‟s denial of Qureshi‟s application for adjustment of
status under the LIFE Act and seek to enforce promises by DEA and Customs agents to
obtain a green card for Qureshi. The complaint contains claims (1) for review of the
USCIS‟ LIFE Act determination under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), (2) for a
declaration that this determination is contrary to law and that Qureshi is entitled to
adjustment of status, and (3) for specific performance of the DEA and Customs agents‟
alleged promises based on a theory of promissory estoppel.
The District Court dismissed Qureshi‟s habeas petition, finding that 8 U.S.C. §
1255(f)(4) deprived it of jurisdiction over the petition. In two separate orders, the District
Court dismissed Qureshi‟s APA, declaratory judgment claims, and his claim for specific
performance. Qureshi timely appealed the District Court‟s orders in both the habeas and
the civil actions and we dispose of both appeals in this opinion.
III. Jurisdiction
We have jurisdiction over Qureshi‟s appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we
“exercise plenary review over a district court's order dismissing a complaint for lack of
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subject matter jurisdiction.” Taliaferro v. Darby Tp. Zoning Bd., 458 F.3d 181, 188 (3d
Cir. 2006). The defendants‟ challenge to Qureshi‟s complaint is a “facial attack” on the
District Court‟s jurisdiction and therefore “we review only whether the allegations on the
face of the complaint, taken as true, allege facts sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the
district court.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “„[F]ederal courts are courts of
limited jurisdiction; they exercise only the authority conferred on them by Art. III and by
congressional enactments pursuant thereto.‟” In re W.R. Grace & Co., 591 F.3d 164, 174
(3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 692 (1986)). In this
case, two congressional enactments limiting the jurisdiction of the federal courts preclude
review of Qureshi‟s claims.
A. Limitations on Judicial Review Under the LIFE Act
Federal courts have been granted only limited jurisdiction to review USCIS
rulings on applications for adjustment of status. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(f)(1). Judicial
review of a denial of an application for adjustment of status is permitted “only in the
judicial review of an order of deportation.” Id. § 1255a(f)(4)(A). Review in conjunction
with an order of removal is the “exclusive scheme” for judicial review of a
“determination respecting an application for adjustment of status.” Reno v. Catholic Soc.
Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 53 (1993). Qureshi has not sought judicial review of his order
of removal and § 1255a(f)(4)(A) therefore precludes review of USCIS‟s denial of his
application for adjustment of status.1 See Qureshi v. U.S. Att’y Gen., No. 08-3128, Order
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A petition for review of that order would be untimely in any case. See Kolkevich
v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 501 F.3d 323, 337 (3d Cir. 2007) (petition for review of removal order
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at 1-2 (3d Cir. Aug. 28, 2008).
Qureshi argues that if § 1255a(f)(4) precluded jurisdiction over his habeas petition,
it would constitute a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9.
In the absence of “a clear, unambiguous, and express statement of congressional intent to
preclude judicial consideration on habeas,” INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 314 (2001),
Qureshi reasons that § 1255a(f)(4) should be read to permit habeas review of his LIFE
Act application.
We disagree with Qureshi‟s initial premise. The Suspension Clause is not
implicated when Congress has provided “adequate substitute procedures” in place of
habeas review. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). Congress has provided a
substitute for habeas for aliens challenging their removal, in the form of judicial review
in the courts of appeals of BIA determinations. See Kolkevich v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 501
F.3d 323, 333 (3d Cir. 2007).
In this case, Qureshi had an adequate opportunity to challenge the legality of the
BIA‟s 1993 final order of removal by petitioning this Court for review. See Kolkevich,
501 F.3d at 327-28, 337. His case is therefore different from St. Cyr and Kolkevich,
where the absence of habeas review “threatened to strip criminal aliens of all judicial
review” of a final order of removal. Kolkevich, 501 F.3d at 332. Here by contrast,
Qureshi has already had an opportunity to obtain judicial review of his final order of
removal and now seeks habeas review of a separate and unrelated determination on his
application for discretionary relief. This does not implicate the Suspension Clause and
pre-dating the REAL ID Act must be filed within 30 days of the passage of the Act).
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thus the interpretive principle articulated in St. Cyr is not applicable.
We therefore adhere to the interpretation of § 1255a(f) we adopted earlier in these
proceedings: Qureshi can only “seek judicial review of the decision denying his
application for an adjustment of status in conjunction with a final order of removal.”
Qureshi v. U.S. Att’y Gen., No. 08-3128, Order at 1-2 (3d Cir. Aug. 28, 2008). Because
Qureshi is not seeking review in conjunction with a final order of removal, §
1255a(f)(4)(A) does not permit judicial review of the denial of his application for
adjustment of status. To the extent that Qureshi‟s habeas petition seeks such review, the
District Court properly dismissed the petition for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Similarly, Qureshi‟s APA and declaratory judgment claims seeking review of USCIS‟s
decision were also properly dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.2
B. Limitations on Judicial Review Under the Tucker Act
The doctrine of sovereign immunity limits federal courts‟ jurisdiction over claims
against the United States. See Hercules Inc. v. United States, 516 U.S. 417, 422-23
(1996). The Tucker Act limits the jurisdiction of federal courts over contract claims
against the United States to claims for money damages. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2),
1491. Because Qureshi‟s promissory estoppel claim sought specific performance, not
2

Qureshi contends that USCIS‟s denial of his application for adjustment of status
is “final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court,” 5 U.S.C.
§ 704, and therefore subject to judicial review under the APA. However, the APA‟s
review provisions do not “confer[] authority to grant relief if any other statute that grants
consent to suit expressly or impliedly forbids the relief which is sought.” 5 U.S.C. § 702.
Because 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(f) sets forth the exclusive process for review of USCIS
decisions on applications for adjustment of status, any other form of review – including
the review sought by Qureshi here – is expressly forbidden and the APA‟s general grant
of jurisdiction is therefore inapplicable.
7

money damages, the District Court correctly concluded that this claim was subject to the
Tucker Act and that the Act precluded jurisdiction over Qureshi‟s claim. See Sea-Land
Serv., Inc. v. Brown, 600 F.2d 429, 432 (3d Cir. 1979); Coggeshall Dev. Corp. v.
Diamond, 884 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1989).
IV. Conclusion
For these reasons, we will affirm the orders of the District Court dismissing
Qureshi‟s habeas petition and complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
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